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COMMENTS
HOW THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION CAN INFORM ITS
INDIAN LAND POLICIES IN LIGHT OF HISTORICAL
BREAKDOWNS
Shae Weathersbee*
Introduction
Before President Donald J. Trump had been sworn in, rumors began
floating around that Trump’s administration planned on privatizing Indian
lands.1 An initial news article indicated that advisors to Trump were
pushing this policy to allow for more lucrative oil extraction, an idea that
spun internet-users into debates.2 In the first two years of the Trump
administration, it is evident that President Trump is aiming to decrease the
bureaucracy that has limited tribes in pursuit of economic development. 3
The extent the administration will go to ease access to tribal resources is
unclear. This Comment aims to elaborate the policy of the Trump
administration regarding Indian lands in order to analyze its potential
ramifications in Indian Country. The policy presented in this Comment has
been formulated based on the administration’s statements and actions
regarding Indian Country. Potential impacts of the policy will be explored
through two case studies, providing real-world consequences of changing
Indian land policies.
I. Background
One of the first articles regarding the privatization of Indian land was
published on December 5, 2016,4 and the very next day, Oklahoma
Representative Markwayne Mullin issued a response that attempted to settle

* Third-year student, University of Oklahoma College of Law.
1. Reuters, Trump Advisors Aim to Privatize Untapped Oil Reserves on Native
American Reservations, FORTUNE (Dec. 5, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/12/05/donaldtrump-oil-reservations/ [hereinafter Trump Advisors Aim to Privatize].
2. Id.
3. Remarks at a Tribal, State, and Local Energy Roundtable Discussion and an
Exchange with Reporters, 2017 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1 (June 28, 2017) [hereinafter
Trump Remarks at Energy Roundtable].
4. Trump Advisors Aim to Privatize, supra note 1.

315

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2018

316

AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42

the fears such articles induced. 5 Mullin, then recently named the chair of
Trump’s Native American Coalition, indicated that the actual focus of the
administration was to “end the overreaching paternalism that has held
American Indians back from being the drivers of their own destiny.” 6
Mullin elaborated on this proposal by suggesting that privatization was not
the mechanism to effectuate this purpose; rather, it was the removal of
restrictions on the utilization of Indian lands. 7 Mullin asserted that seeking
the approval of the Bureau of Indian Affairs and the Bureau of Land
Management should not be required for tribes to utilize their lands. 8
The response of the Native American Coalition did not placate the
growing concerns of some Americans, who recognized that President
Trump’s pro-business policies could lead to great changes surrounding
Indian trust lands.9 News sources reported that while reservations only
encompass around two percent of land in the United States, they are alleged
to entail twenty percent of the country’s oil and gas resources. 10 The Trump
administration’s stance against heavy regulation seemed to substantiate
rumors that Indian lands would be privatized to remove regulations and
federal bureaucracy surrounding mineral leases and other forms of
development.11 Leaders in Indian Country stood divided on the idea of
privatizing lands to make way for more development. 12 Some leaders totally
opposed such efforts, as they would lead tribes down a path of
commodification that was against spiritual beliefs. 13 There was a further
fear that privatization would herald a new Termination Era and be yet
another attempt of the United States to remove tribal sovereignty in pursuit

5. Christine Powell, Trump Adviser Says He’s Not Privatizing Tribal Land, LAW 360
(Dec. 6, 2016), https://www.law360.com/articles/869536/trump-adviser-says-he-s-notprivatizing-tribal-land (internal citation omitted).
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Hayley Miller, Trump’s Policies Show Profound Disregard for Native Americans,
DNC Chair Says, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 7, 2017), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/
trump-native-americans-tom-perez_us_59889853e4b0ca8b1d49e6df.
10. Trump Advisors Aim to Privatize, supra note 1.
11. Miller, supra note 9.
12. Valerie Volcovici, Trump Advisors Aim to Privatize Oil-Rich Indian Reservations,
REUTERS (Dec. 5, 2016), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-tribes-insight/trumpadvisors-aim-to-privatize-oil-rich-indian-reservations-idUSKBN13U1B1.
13. Id.
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of economic gains.14 With $1.5 trillion worth of resources on the line, it
appeared that many parties would want a say in this debate. 15
In the summer of 2017, more news articles were published in response to
the Trump administration’s treatment of Native American issues in the first
months of the presidency. Politicians such as Democratic National
Committee Chair, Tom Perez, spoke out, claiming the administration’s
continued promotion of the privatization of lands was comparable to the
“‘catastrophic’ Eisenhower-era policy.”16 Perez asserted that since
President Nixon, the presidents of this country have supported “selfdetermination without termination,” yet this presidency appeared to be
parting with this position by not only supporting the privatization of Indian
lands but also by questioning the legitimacy of federal housing block grants
for Indians, enabling via executive order the expansion of drilling in the
Atlantic and Arctic, planning a wall that would run through Indian Country,
and proposing a budget that cut approximately $300 million from the
Bureau of Indian Affairs.17 Other news articles similarly reiterated Trump’s
plans on the privatization of Indian Country. 18
As news sources indicated that privatization remained on the table,
arguments developed on both sides, with supporters of privatization
heralding the freedom such action would bring. Excessive bureaucracy
would not burden Indians when trying to seek profit from natural
resources.19 Mortgages could be taken out more easily on lands for capital,
removing the paternalistic hand of the federal government. 20 However,
voices on the other side worried that this plan seemed far too familiar and
recalled the days of termination wherein tribes lost millions of acres of land
and even tribal recognition in some cases. 21 Without trust land and federal
oversight, some fear the elimination of tribal sovereignty because there will
be no physical location for a tribe to assert jurisdiction. 22 Tribal members
may be forced to assimilate into society at large. 23
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Miller, supra note 9.
17. Id.
18. Tom Perez, Opinion, Trump Is Breaking the Federal Government’s Promises to
Native Americans, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 7, 2017), http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oeperez-native-american-indians-trump-20170807-story.html.
19. Volcovici, supra note 12.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
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II. The Trump Administration’s Course of Action
To best predict the future actions of the Trump administration and the
changes Indian Country is likely to face, it is important to analyze actions
taken by both the executive and legislative branches. Considering the
actions of both branches will indicate the extent to which Trump policies
will be carried out and the shape these policies will assume.
A. Executive Action
President Donald Trump’s policies towards Indian Country encompass
the same overarching principles as his plans for the United States at large,
with the added complication of federal obligations owed to the tribes. Since
taking office, Trump has consistently vocalized the goal of American
energy dominance. 24 The President’s actions in the first year of his
presidency aimed to increase access to the nation’s energy resources,
attempting to provide room for American ingenuity to flourish. 25 This
policy has intended to promote the American economy in order to pay off
the national debt and to provide thousands of additional jobs to American
citizens.26
While news sources report that Trump still aims to privatize lands,
presidential documents indicate only that the administration wishes to
reduce regulations surrounding land utilization. President Trump, in several
proclamations and memoranda, has emphasized a need to cut the
bureaucratic thicket to enable tribes to have better access to natural
resources.27 He has asserted a plan to limit the need for approval before
development can take place and has hinted at the removal of restraints on
alienation of Indian lands.28 At the same time, the administration has
attempted to come to terms with how to balance tribal self-determination
with the responsibilities the federal government owes to the tribes.29

24. Trump Remarks at Energy Roundtable, supra note 3; Remarks on Signing an
Executive Order on Promoting Energy Independence and Economic Growth, 2017 DAILY
COMP. PRES. DOC. 1 (Mar. 28, 2017).
25. Remarks on Signing an Executive Order on Promoting Energy Independence and
Economic Growth, supra note 24, at 1; Exec. Order No. 13783, 82 Fed. Reg. 16093 (Mar.
28, 2017).
26. Remarks on Signing an Executive Order on Promoting Energy Independence and
Economic Growth, supra note 24, at 1.
27. Trump Remarks at Energy Roundtable, supra note 3, at 1.
28. Id.
29. Id.
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The administration has voiced its desire to transform the relationship
between tribes and the federal government. Trump indicated that the United
States is stronger when Indian Country is strong. 30 Reformations in Indian
Country are necessary to achieve goals elsewhere. 31 President Trump
announced in October of 2017 that his administration is pursuing
“aggressive regulatory reform” in Indian affairs and aims to promote a
“government-to-government” relationship between tribes and the federal
government.32 Despite the administration’s recognition of the importance of
tribal sovereignty to the health of Indian Country, actions by the
administration have been mixed, making it difficult to discern the
administration’s future actions.
The Trump administration has supported cooperative economic growth
in Indian Country, but support began largely as remarks and memoranda.
President Trump and Secretary of Energy Rick Perry’s remarks at the
Tribal, State, and Local Energy Roundtable indicated a desire for greater
cooperation between all levels of government to allow utilization of energy
reserves that have previously been left dormant. 33 Trump stated that
“unlocking vast treasures of energy reserves” would mean “creat[ing] new
prosperity” for Americans.34 Beyond statements, Trump issued the first
Presidential Emergency Declaration on behalf of a tribal nation. 35 This
declaration aimed to assure the Seminole Tribe of Florida that the United
States would support its rebuilding effort after Hurricane Irma.36 With
Trump taking actions such as ending the moratorium on coal leasing on
federal lands and pursuing the repeal of the Obama Administration’s Clean
Power Plan and Stream Protection Rule, it appears it may not be long
before the administration takes further deregulatory measures in Indian
Country. 37
Recently, the Trump administration has turned words into action via the
Tax Cuts and Jobs Act. In December of 2017, President Trump signed into
30. Id. at 2.
31. Id.
32. Proclamation 9669-National Native American Heritage Month, 2017 DAILY COMP.
PRES. DOC. 1 (Oct. 31, 2017).
33. Trump Remarks at Energy Roundtable, supra note 3, at 2.
34. Id. at 1.
35. Seminole Tribe of Florida; Major Disaster and Related Determinations, 82 Fed.
Reg. 46813 (Oct. 6, 2017).
36. Proclamation 9669-National Native American Heritage Month, supra note 32, at 1.
37. President Donald J. Trump Unleashes America’s Energy Potential, WHITE HOUSE
(June 27, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/president-donald-jtrump-unleashes-americas-energy-potential/.
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law the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017. 38 Of particular relevance is the
Opportunity Zones Program, a bipartisan effort included in the Act that
comprises part of the President’s “comprehensive tax reform plan.”39 The
program attempts to address the lack of economic development in
underserved parts of the country. 40 In order to effectuate this goal, the
enacted program utilizes tax incentives to draw investment to the areas that
need it most—including Native communities. 41 Oklahoma Native American
Affairs Secretary Chris Benge was “pleased” that the zones will “provide a
range of opportunities for investors to collaborate with many of the tribal
nations.”42 As of April 2018, a variety of legislators have voiced support for
this attempt to bring together public policy and private investment to create
real-world change. 43
In March of 2018, the Trump administration vocalized support for
increased access to treatment in light of the opioid epidemic and pushed for
concrete improvements in access to healthcare.44 Most notably, with regards
to Indian affairs, President Trump has supported increased funding for the
Department of Health and Human Services. 45 President Trump’s proposed
Federal Budget requested $3 billion in additional funding for 2018 and $10
billion for 2019.46 Contained in the allocations of this additional funding are
provisions for resources to increase access to treatment and recovery in
Native communities. 47
In contrast with the above statements of Indian self-determination, the
administration has supported highly controversial energy projects affecting
38. John Wagner, Trump Signs Sweeping Tax Bill into Law, WASH. POST (Dec. 22,
2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2017/12/22/trump-signssweeping-tax-bill-into-law/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.b290fd198b9f; Budget Fiscal Year,
2018, Pub. L. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054 (2017).
39. President Donald J. Trump Is Expanding Entrepreneurial Opportunity in
Underserved Communities, WHITE HOUSE (Feb. 14, 2018), https://www.whitehouse.gov/
briefings-statements/president-donald-j-trump-expanding-entrepreneurial-opportunityunderserved-communities/.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. WTAS: Support for the Trump Administration’s Approval of Opportunity Zones,
WHITE HOUSE (Apr. 18, 2018), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/wtassupport-trump-administrations-approval-opportunity-zones/.
43. Id.
44. How We Will Win the War on Opioids, WHITE HOUSE (Mar. 1, 2018), https://www.
whitehouse.gov/articles/will-win-war-opioids/.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
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Indian Country in pursuit of American energy dominance. After being
stalled, the Dakota Access Pipeline was expedited by executive order. 48 The
memoranda released accompanying the action indicated the
administration’s intentions to minimize regulatory hurdles to expedite “high
priority energy and infrastructure projects that will create jobs and increase
national security.”49 Although the project was predicted to have great
economic benefits, highly visible protests presented the project’s potential
negative impacts, including interfering with Native American sacred sites
and contaminating the Standing Rock Reservation’s drinking water. 50
It does not appear that the administration has accounted for tribal
religious practice when making decisions regarding the utilization of
federal lands. In December of 2017, President Trump modified Bears Ears
National Monument to include less land area.51 After determining the
amount of land set aside exceeded what was required under law to protect
cultural resources, President Trump ordered a reduction in size of the
monument.52 This decision is indicative of a desire to open federal land for
alternative use, despite the protests of tribal groups who believe the
decision will adversely impact their cultural or religious practices.
The construction of a wall along the southern border of the United States,
an element of the Trump administration’s immigration policy, evidences the
willingness of the administration to encroach on tribal sovereignty when
national security interests are involved. 53 The Tohono O’odham Nation
encompasses part of the United States’ border with Mexico. 54 The Tribe has
made previous agreements with the U.S. Customs and Border Patrol to
allow for the construction of a fence and access to guard it. 55 However, the
proposed border wall would cut directly through tribal land without the
Tribe’s consent.56 In July of 2017, the House of Representatives approved

48. Exec. Order No. 13766, 82 Fed. Reg. 8657 (Jan. 24, 2017).
49. President Trump Takes Action to Expedite Priority Energy and Infrastructure
Projects, WHITE HOUSE (Jan. 24, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/
president-trump-takes-action-expedite-priority-energy-infrastructure-projects/.
50. Justin Worland, What to Know About the Dakota Access Pipeline Protests, TIME
(Oct. 28, 2016), http://time.com/4548566/dakota-access-pipeline-standing-rock-sioux/.
51. Proclamation No. 9681: Modifying the Bears Ears National Monument, 82 Fed.
Reg. 58081, 58085 (Dec. 4, 2017).
52. Id.
53. Perez, supra note 18.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
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the allocation of $1.6 billion to begin construction of the wall. 57 In January
of 2018, news sources reported that Trump was planning a visit to examine
border wall prototypes.58 Also in January of 2018, President Trump sought
an additional $18 billion from Congress to build the wall. 59 The Trump
administration has reaffirmed its commitment to continue with plans to
build a wall as recently as the summer of 2018.60
Despite a lack of presidential statements on the matter, tribes have
nonetheless begun feeling pressure to privatize tribal lands. In May of 2017,
Secretary of the Interior Ryan Zinke proclaimed that there should be an
“off-ramp” to get tribal lands out of trust.61 During further remarks at the
National Tribal Energy Summit, Zinke asserted that if tribes had an option
between lands staying in trust or becoming incorporated, the tribes would
choose incorporation.62 Commentators have indicated that the
administration further wishes to depart with previous administrations’
Indian policies based on verbiage in the signing statement of House Bill
244.63 The signing statement asserts that the administration will afford
benefits that are based on race or ethnicity in “a manner consistent with the
requirement to afford equal protection of the laws under the Due Process
Clause of the Constitution’s Fifth Amendment.”64 The statement
specifically mentions Native American Housing Block Grants, an action
commentators have interpreted to indicate that federal provisions based on
Indian status may be at risk despite the class being previously determined
political and not racial.65
Although members of Trump’s Native American Coalition have come
forth and said privatization of Indian lands is not the route the Department
of the Interior plans to take, statements as recent as the fall of 2017 indicate
the President’s intentions to modify the ability of Native Americans to
57. Id.
58. Rebecca Shabad, Trump to Visit Border Wall Prototypes in San Diego: Report, CBS
NEWS (Jan. 8, 2018), https://www.cbsnews.com/amp/news/trump-to-visit-border-wallprototypes-in-san-diego-report/.
59. Id.
60. Remarks by President Trump at a Lunch with Members of Congress, WHITE HOUSE
(June 26, 2018), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trumplunch-members-congress/.
61. Perez, supra note 18.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Statement on Signing the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2017 DAILY COMP.
PRES. DOC. 3 (May 5, 2017).
65. Perez, supra note 18.
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utilize lands.66 The collection of memoranda and orders released by the
Trump administration indicates a focus on stimulating economic growth
amongst Indians by deregulating their utilization of trust lands in order to
promote the overall economic well-being of the United States. In this
process, Indian interests may be outweighed by the administration’s policy
of pursuing American energy dominance. The administration may favor the
privatization or deregulation of Indian lands to remove the disparate
treatment of Indians, as viewed by mainstream America, from that of the
rest of the population.
B. Legislative Action
In contrast to the Trump administration’s statements about equal
treatment, Carcieri v. Salazar declared that the land-into-trust provision of
the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 (IRA) was only applicable to tribes
that were federally recognized at the time of the IRA’s enactment. 67
Therefore, only tribes recognized by 1934 have been able to take land into
trust and pursue the other programs under the Act.68 The extent to which the
IRA applies to tribes that were later recognized remains uncertain. 69 This
means that expensive litigation, costing taxpayers large sums, continues
while development is inhibited.70 Legislative fixes have been considered,
including recent House Bills 130 and 131 introduced in January of 2017. 71
House Bill 130 would reassert the ability of the Secretary of the Interior to
take land into trust for all federally recognized tribes, without regard to
their date of recognition. 72 House Bill 131 holds in place the lands already
in trust.73 As of July of 2018, these bills have not moved past introduction. 74

66. Proclamation 9669-National Native American Heritage Month, supra note 32, at 1.
67. Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379, 390-91 (2009) (discussing Indian Reorganization
Act of 1934, ch. 576, § 19, 48 Stat. 984, 988 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 5129)).
68. NAT’L CONG. OF AM. INDIANS, POLICY UPDATE 5 (2017), http://www.ncai.org/
attachments/PolicyPaper_zZTmwUgiMOBFwXQKgNIDMPzHsGLyRoEArzrzjCwRJtJznx
BGJFJ_Annual%20Policy%20Update%202017%20-%20Final%2010.13.pdf.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 6.
71. H.R. 130, 115th Cong. § 1 (2017); H.R. 131, 115th Cong. § 1 (2017).
72. H.R. 130 § 1.
73. H.R. 131 § 1.
74. H.R. 130 Tracker, CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/
house-bill/130 (last visited July 27, 2018); H.R. 131 Tracker, CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.
congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/house-bill/131?q=%7B%22search%22%3A%5B%22H.R
%3E+131%22%5D%7D&r=2 (last visited July 27, 2018).
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In accordance with President Trump’s emphasis on collective decisionmaking, the House Natural Resources Subcommittee on Indian, Insular and
Alaska Native Affairs undertook an oversight hearing that was meant to
address concerns with the modern implementation of the provisions of the
IRA.75 Particularly, the Subcommittee vocalized concerns with the landinto-trust provision, stating “the Secretary has acquired land in trust
regardless of the impact on . . . tribes, states and local governments, and
landowners, and regardless of the capacity of the government to manage the
trust lands.”76 Uncertainty still remains regarding the extent of the
Secretary’s authority to take lands into trust and what factors must be
considered in such decisions.77 The Department of the Interior has
promulgated proposed changes to land acquisition to tribal leaders. 78 The
proposals aim to make decisions more predictable but increase the
requirements for application of off-reservation land-into-trust
applications.79
Legislative attempts to limit the amounts of dormant federal land
reinforce Trump’s plans to utilize American energy resources. House Bill
621, also known as the Disposal of Excess Federal Lands Act of 2017,
meant to sell more than 3.3 million acres of federal land. 80 After opposition
to the measure by sportsmen groups, statements have been made that the
legislation will be withdrawn.81 Although this specific bill might not be
taken any further, its proposal indicates that other similar plans may be
taken to utilize previously dormant federal land. 82
The Indian Trust Asset Reform Act (ITARA), enacted in 2016, provided
a first step in modernizing the trust system and is harmonious with the
Trump administration’s deregulatory policy. 83 The Act lets tribes make
choices about how to utilize their land, allowing tribal action without
federal approval in some cases.84 Approvals can delay development for
decades.85 ITARA strikes against part of the bureaucratic thicket by limiting
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

NAT’L CONG. OF AM. INDIANS, supra note 68, at 6.
Id.
Id. at 9.
Id. at 6.
Id. at 6-7.
H.R. 621, 115th Cong. (2017); see NAT’L CONG. OF AM. INDIANS, supra note 68, at

81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

NAT’L CONG. OF AM. INDIANS, supra note 68, at 7.
Id. at 6.
Indian Trust Asset Reform Act § 205, 25 U.S.C.A. § 5614 (West 2016).
Id. § 205(b), 25 U.S.C.A. § 5614(b).
NAT’L CONG. OF AM. INDIANS, supra note 68, at 10.

7.
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the number of steps that need to be taken to develop lands. 86 The legislation
particularly impacts the Office of the Special Trustee (OST), which reviews
all appraisals of trust transactions.87 ITARA calls for the Department of the
Interior (DOI) to work with tribal governments to create plans that
reallocate functions of the OST to other bureaus or offices, minimizing
OST oversight.88 The Act empowers the DOI to create minimum criteria for
entities to appraise or valuate trust lands.89 The Act authorizes the Secretary
of the Interior to appoint an Under Secretary for Indian Affairs, who would
be the first official in the DOI with powers in BIA agencies and non-Indian
agencies.90 This “cross-agency advocate” would ensure Indian interests are
included in all discussions throughout the DOI. 91
Recent legislation involving Indian affairs has largely centered around
economic development, a key Indian policy priority for the Trump
administration. In March of 2018, the Native American Business Incubators
Program Act passed the Senate. 92 If enacted, this bill would require the
Department of the Interior to establish a grant program to create and operate
business incubators tasked with serving Native communities. 93 These
incubators would support small Native businesses by helping them acquire
the resources they need to be successful. 94 Another bill that has moved past
the introductory phase is the Indian Community Economic Enhancement
Act of 2018.95 Passed in the Senate in March of 2018, the bill amends the
Native American Business Development, Trade Promotion, and Tourism
Act of 2000 and calls upon the Office of Native American Business
Development (ONABD) to increase support of tribal economic
development.96 Among other provisions, the bill would require the ONABD
86. Id. at 11.
87. Id.
88. Indian Trust Asset Reform Act § 304, 25 U.S.C.A. § 5634.
89. Id. § 305, 25 U.S.C.A. § 5635.
90. Id. § 303, 25 U.S.C.A. § 5633; see also NAT’L CONG. OF AM. INDIANS, supra note
68, at 11.
91. NAT’L CONG. OF AM. INDIANS, supra note 68, at 11.
92. S. 607, 115th Cong. (2017); S. 607 – Native American Business Incubators Program
Act Tracker, CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/senate-bill/607
(last visited July 27, 2018).
93. S. 607 § 4(a).
94. Id.
95. S. 1116, 115th Cong. (2017); S.1116 – Indian Community Economic Enhancement
Act of 2018 Tracker, CONGRESS. GOV, https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/senatebill/1116 (last visited July 27, 2018).
96. Id.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2018

326

AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42

to advise the Department of Commerce on the relationship between Indians
and the federal government and require ONABD to act as the point of
contact for tribes inquiring about economic development and business on
Indian land.97 The Office of the Assistant Secretary for Indian Affairs and
the Community Development Financial Institutions Fund are tasked with
collaborating on projects to support tribal economic development. 98
C. Additional Considerations
Of interest to the Trump administration and Congress, energy resources
on tribal lands serve a dual function of both enabling tribal development
and supplying the United States with greater domestic energy sources. 99
However, unlike resources outside of Indian lands, tribal resources face
greater difficulties in development.100 Federal approvals, bureaucracy, and
financial limitations, among other factors, mean that it takes longer to
develop resources on tribal lands. Indian energy policy has not been
significantly changed in ten years. 101 Potential amendments to the Indian
Tribal Energy Development and Self-Determination Act, proposed by the
Senate in January of 2017, would provide additional resources to enable
greater tribal control over development of various energy sources. 102 The
bill and proposed amendments seek to streamline approval processes and
extend access to programs.103 The proposed Native American Energy Act of
2017 (House Bill 210) further aims to reduce obstacles to energy
development by encouraging standardized procedures and implementing
time limitations for secretarial approval. 104 Additionally, the proposed
legislation includes the ability for tribes to waive appraisal requirements
and dictates that the Secretary of the Interior is to enter into agreements
with tribes to implement demonstration projects targeted at developing
energy production.105
The proposed legislation since President Trump took office largely
echoes the executive branch’s goals. Both branches appear to support some
level of deregulation of Indian land use and portray a desire to promote
97. S. 1116 § 3(c).
98. Id. § 8(a).
99. NAT’L CONG. OF AM. INDIANS, supra note 68, at 12-13.
100. Id. at 13.
101. Id.
102. Indian Tribal Energy Development and Self-Determination Act Amendments of
2017, S. 245, 115th Cong. (2017).
103. NAT’L CONG. OF AM. INDIANS, supra note 68, at 13.
104. H.R. 210, 115th Cong. §§ 2-3 (2017).
105. Id. §§ 2, 6.
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Indian self-determination and economic development. This could mean that
action, beyond mere words, is more likely to be taken under Trump’s
presidency. However, it is important to note that it has been ten years since
major reformations have been made to Indian energy policy. 106 Therefore, it
may take time for the promulgation of new legislation to reinforce the
shared goals of the legislative and executive branches.
III. Case Studies
In order to fully understand the impacts that changes to policies
regarding Indian lands may have, it is essential to look at similar past
policies. Analyzing previous policies helps to prevent the repetition of
tragic consequences, ensuring that modern policies are refined by historical
knowledge. The Termination Era is an informative first case study because
it presents the consequences of removing federal oversight from tribal land
holdings. Additionally, some of the criticizers of the Trump
administration’s Indian policies have likened them to those of the
Termination Era.107 Analysis of the Termination Era will shed light on the
fairness of these critiques.
The Alaskan Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA) provides
additional insight into the results of changes in alienation of land in pursuit
of American energy development and will serve as another useful case
study. Analyzing the impacts of this policy will be highly relevant to
policies endorsed by Trump because the corporations that resulted from
ANCSA are possible models for the privatization of Indian lands. This
corporate structure serves as an example of how tribes can engage in the
energy market. ANCSA further indicates how forced action by the federal
government can create indefinite limitations on tribal sovereignty.
Each of the case study sections will first explore the background of the
policy and then move on to the statutory framework. After the immediate
and long-term impacts of the policy are explored, these insights will be
applied to President Trump’s policies.

106. NAT’L CONG. OF AM. INDIANS, supra note 68, at 13.
107. Miller, supra note 9.
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A. Termination Era
1. Background and Goals
Before the Termination Era, the Reorganization Era attempted to balance
the competing goals of autonomy and assimilation in Indian affairs.108 The
Indian Reorganization Act (IRA) was the centerpiece of the era.109 The Act
attempted to approximate institutions found within American society at
large on reservations.110 This included the promotion of the creation of
tribal constitutions and bylaws, which mirrored that of the American
government.111 Tribes were encouraged to retain cultural practices and
customs. 112 The Act prevented reservation land from being sold into nonIndian ownership.113 Despite the attempted compromise, Indians were
unsatisfied with the policy’s promotion of Western ideals of government
and the great federal oversight of tribal actions on reservations.114 During
the mid-1940s, it became evident that the measures Congress and the
Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) had taken in order to advance the ultimate
goal of assimilating Native Americans was largely unsuccessful. 115 The
dissatisfaction of Indians, the cost of administering the IRA, and a change
of power within the BIA initiated a policy shift. 116 Subcommittees of
Congress began to investigate plans to relieve tribes of the control of the
BIA.117
Termination was partially a product of the United States attempting to
distance itself from racial classifications that were invoked by Germany
during World War II. In an address to the National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People, President Truman asserted that “[t]here is
no justifiable reason for discrimination because of ancestry, or religion, or

108. Michael C. Walch, Terminating the Indian Termination Policy, 35 STAN. L. REV.
1181, 1183 (1983).
109. Id.
110. Id. at 1183-84.
111. Id.; Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 § 16, 25 U.S.C. § 5123(a) (2012).
112. Walch, supra note 108, at 1183.
113. Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 § 1, 25 U.S.C. § 5101.
114. Walch, supra note 108, at 1184.
115. Charles F. Wilkinson & Eric R. Biggs, The Evolution of the Termination Policy, 5
AM. INDIAN L. REV. 139, 145-46 (1977).
116. Id. at 144-46.
117. Id. at 146.
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race, or color.”118 Truman’s election ushered in a “liberal assimilationist
trend.”119 Fair Deal policies focused on promoting civil rights and economic
progress to ensure the integration of minorities within American society. 120
Overall, the drive for civil rights in this era intended to “free[] the
individual from supposedly invidious group identity, especially that of race,
so that he or she could compete freely and form associations voluntarily in
the great society.”121 The Truman administration saw the reservation system
as segregating Native Americans from the rest of society and called for
what would eventually be the goal of the Eisenhower termination policy—
ensuring that Indians were placed in the same position in society as other
Americans.122
2. Statutory Framework
Termination became the general policy of the federal government with
the passage of House Concurrent Resolution 108 (HCR 108), which was
bolstered by additional acts that eliminated the trust relationship between
specific tribes and the federal government. 123 Public Law 280 (PL 280)
enabled electing states to assume some civil and criminal jurisdiction over
tribes, essentially displacing the previous federal and tribal control over
such matters.124 Educational programs promoted assimilation and affected
Indian lands were relieved of restraints on alienation. 125 Relocation
programs aimed at moving reservation Indians to other areas.126
Congress asserted its intentions with regards to Indians in the text of
HCR 108, calling for Indians to be “subject to the same laws and entitled to
the same privileges and responsibilities as are applicable to other citizens of
the United States.”127 Although this resolution had no true power of
enforceability and was simply a policy statement, this viewpoint retained

118. Harry S. Truman, Address Before the National Association for the Advancement of
Colored People (June 29, 1947), AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT, http://www.presidency.ucsb.
edu/ws/index.php?pid=12686 (last visited May 18, 2017).
119. Clayton R. Koppes, From New Deal to Termination: Liberalism and Indian Policy,
1933-1953, 46 PAC. HIST. REV. 543, 558 (1977).
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 559.
123. Wilkinson & Biggs, supra note 115, at 149.
124. Id. at 149; see 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (2012); see also 18 U.S.C. 1162 (2012).
125. Wilkinson & Biggs, supra note 115, at 149.
126. Id. at 147.
127. H.R. Con. Res. 108, 83rd Cong., 67 Stat. § B122 (1953).
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influence in the individual acts of termination that followed. 128 Under the
authority of these acts, the Secretary of the Interior developed plans that
terminated the historic federal-tribal relationship for the affected tribe. 129
These acts contained some similar provisions. 130 The structure of land
ownership changed and often entailed tribal land being sold. 131 The trust
relationship that enabled tribes to receive aid in resource management and
protected tribal lands from leaving tribal ownership was terminated. 132
States gained legislative jurisdiction over many subject areas of tribal
concern.133 Criminal and civil matters arising amongst Indians of the
terminated tribe were directed to state court.134 Tribes no longer benefitted
from exemption from state taxes. 135 Federal programs directed towards
tribes were extinguished. 136 Federal programs created specifically for tribal
members ended. 137 The loss of tribal lands effectively ended tribal
sovereignty, as tribes had no land over which to assert jurisdiction. 138
Although nothing in the termination acts specifically eliminated the
inherent sovereignty of tribes, no terminated tribe continued to pass or
enforce laws or preserve tribal courts.139
In 1953, Congress passed PL 280, which aimed at curbing lawlessness
on reservations while assimilating tribes and decreasing federal spending. 140
The Act granted California, Minnesota, Nebraska, Oregon, and Wisconsin
criminal and some civil jurisdiction in Indian Country. 141 Congress placed a
few limitations on state authority. The Act did not “authorize the alienation,
encumbrance, or taxation of any real or personal property, including water
rights” of the tribes over which the Act granted jurisdiction.142 Tribes
explicitly maintained hunting, fishing, and some property rights if protected
128. Wilkinson & Biggs, supra note 115, at 150-51.
129. Id. at 151-52.
130. Id. at 152.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 152-53.
134. Id. at 153.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 153-54.
139. Id. at 154.
140. See Act of Aug. 15, 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-280, 67 Stat. 588; Vanessa J. Jimenez &
Soo C. Song, Concurrent Tribal and State Jurisdiction Under Public Law 280, 47 AM. U.L.
REV. 1627, 1657-65 (1998).
141. Act of Aug. 15, 1953, § 2, 67 Stat. at 588.
142. 18 U.S.C. § 1162(b) (2012).
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by federal statute, treaty, or agreement. 143 Additional states were provided
the option of gaining jurisdiction without the consent of the tribe, and this
offer was not revoked until the passage of the Indian Civil Rights Act of
1968, when tribal consent became required before states could adopt PL
280 jurisdiction.144 The assumption of jurisdiction by states over tribes
marked a great change in the federal-tribal relationship that historically
characterized Indian affairs.145
3. Immediate Impacts
In all, 109 tribes and bands suffered termination and no less than
1,362,155 acres of tribal land were impacted by the policy.146 The erosion
of the tribal land base had a large impact on affected Indians in their daily
lives. The sale of tribal lands meant that Indians had to migrate to find new
residences.147 Indians lacking the education and skill sets required by
mainstream employers struggled to find jobs. 148 There was also a persistent
lack of desire to integrate with mainstream American society that served as
an obstacle.149 Attitudes amongst non-Indian Americans further limited
employment and socialization prospects. 150 This difficulty in employment
was exacerbated by additional financial obligations—taxes—imparted to
Indians as a result of termination. 151 All benefits and programs formerly
provided by the federal government ended, leaving many Indians unable to
live off of previously provided welfare. 152 The freedom promised by the
termination acts in actuality cost tribes sovereignty, while their members
lost a sense of community.153
A series of programs by BIA Commissioner Dillon Myer further aimed
at engaging Indians in Western society but ended up having unfortunate
consequences. Adding to the lost sense of community was the impact of the
Voluntary Relocation Program that led to Indians moving off of

143. Id.
144. Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, tit. IV, § 401, 82 Stat. 73, 78
(codified at 25 U.S.C. § 1321).
145. Jimenez & Song, supra note 140, at 1656-57.
146. Wilkinson & Biggs, supra note 115, at 151.
147. Walch, supra note 108, at 1189.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 1189-90.
153. Id. at 1190.
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reservations.154 This plan, although named “voluntary,” was not always
reported as such.155 Commissioner Myer indicated that the program meant
to provide employment services and relocation for forty percent of the
Indian population based on a projection that reservation resources could
only sustain sixty percent of the population. 156 The program strived to
counter the flawed assimilation plans on reservations that tended to focus
on farming and left Indians in rural poverty. 157 However, due to monetary
limits, only a model program was carried out. 158 In another attempt to
address poverty, Commissioner Myer removed some of the restraints on
land in 1951.159 Area directors were enabled to issue fee patents and
approve sale of Indian lands. 160 Indians were allowed to mortgage land to
secure loans.161 Inflation after the war prompted some Indians to sell land to
take advantage of the higher selling prices, further reducing Indian
holdings.162
The growing awareness of the detrimental impact that termination had on
Indians and tribes meant the policy ended relatively quickly. After the end
of termination acts in 1962, President Nixon officially repudiated the policy
in 1969, proposing a new focus on self-determination for Indians.163
4. Long-Term Impacts
Despite the repudiation of termination policy, Congress has not
effectively counteracted the impact of termination on tribes that have not
had their termination acts repealed. 164 Many of the terminated tribes remain
terminated today.165 Tribes that have regained their federal recognition may
still be deprived of their reservations. 166 The Wyandotte, Ottawa, Modoc,
and Peoria tribes did not regain tribal lands in the Act restoring their federal

154. Wilkinson & Biggs, supra note 115, at 147.
155. Id. at 147-48.
156. Kenneth R. Philp, Dillon S. Myer and the Advent of Termination: 1950-1953, 19 W.
HIST. Q. 37, 48 (1988).
157. Id.
158. Id. at 49.
159. Id. at 47.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 47-48.
163. Walch, supra note 108, at 1191.
164. Id. at 1192.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 1192-93.
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recognition.167 Land loss impacts a tribe’s ability to govern itself because
jurisdiction and authority are intimately intertwined with land ownership. 168
In addition to the restoration of federal recognition, the Menominee Tribe
regained land that was under a tribal corporation, which Congress restored
to reservation status.169 However, no compensation was given for land that
left tribal ownership during termination. 170 An additional restoration act
transferred federal land to the Siletz and Paiute Tribe of Utah to establish
reservations; however, the amount of land given was dictated in one case by
the economic needs of the Tribe and in another by an arbitrary
determination.171
Terminated tribes are prohibited from being re-recognized through the
federal acknowledgment procedure of the BIA.172 The current regulation
detailing federal recognition of unrecognized tribes entails several
requirements, including that the tribe is not “the subject of congressional
legislation that has expressly terminated or forbidden the Federal
relationship.”173 Tribes never before recognized by the federal government
can receive federal programs and benefits once approved by the BIA, but
terminated tribes may not resort to this pathway for federal recognition. 174
The impacts of PL 280 have been partially mitigated by provisions of
Congress, but in the states that have adopted its jurisdiction, tribes must
yield indefinitely to another sovereign having control over some of its
affairs. As previously mentioned, the Act prevented state encumbrances on
Indian trust land and the regulation of hunting and fishing rights dictated by
federal law.175 Tribal ordinances and customs were later “given full force
and effect” in civil actions where they did not conflict with state law. 176
Bryan v. Itasca County denied states general civil regulatory jurisdiction in
167. Act of May 15, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-281, 92 Stat. 246 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 861
(Supp. V 1981)) (omitted); Walch, supra note 108, at 1193.
168. Walch, supra note 108, at 1193.
169. Menominee Restoration Act, Pub. L. No. 93-197, 87 Stat. 770 (1973) (codified at 25
U.S.C. § 903 (1976)) (omitted); Walch, supra note 108, at 1193.
170. Walch, supra note 108, at 1193.
171. Siletz Indian Tribe Restoration Act, Pub. L. No. 95-195, 91 Stat. 1415 (1977)
(codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 711-771 (Supp. V 1981)) (omitted); Paiute Indian Tribe of Utah
Restoration Act, Pub. L. No. 96-227, 94 Stat. 317 (1980) (codified at 25 U.S.C. § § 761-768
(Supp. V. 1981)) (omitted); Walch, supra note 108, at 1193-94.
172. 25 C.F.R. § 83.11(g) (2015).
173. Id.
174. Walch, supra note 108, at 1194-95.
175. 28 U.S.C. § 1360(b) (2012).
176. Id. § 1360(c).
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Indian Country. 177 A 1975 report by the United States Department of
Justice emphasized that despite only covering six states, 359 of the 500
federally recognized tribes were under the authority of PL 280. 178 This
report indicated failures of both state and tribal authorities in assuring
applicable laws were respected in Indian Country. 179 Violent crime on
Indian reservations subject to PL 280 was fifty percent higher than in other
rural areas of the United States. 180 A 1999 report by the Justice Department
indicated that crime rates on reservations under PL 280 were higher than
that of reservations not under its domain. 181 This trend may be due to tribes
under PL 280 no longer receiving support for tribal police forces from the
BIA.182 Coupled with the fact that the federal government does not provide
aid to states that assume PL 280 jurisdiction, the refusal of funds to tribal
governments means further breakdown of law enforcement. 183
Individual tribal experiences better demonstrate how termination has a
lasting impact on descendants of terminated tribes. In 1951, the Menominee
Tribe attained a judgment of $8,500,000 against the United States for
improper administration of the Menominee Tribal Forest. 184 The Tribe
requested that part of the trust fund held by the United States for the Tribe
be disbursed at a rate of $1500 per capita.185 The House passed a bill to
disburse these funds, but the Subcommittee on Indian Affairs halted the bill
in the Senate, claiming that if tribal members were able to manage this
amount of money, then they were not in need of federal supervision. 186 The
Tribe was informed of the Senate’s position and told that in order to receive
the money, the Tribe would have to agree to undergo termination. 187 The
General Council of the Menominee Tribe met and decided to undergo
termination. 188 This decision was made with the consent of 169 of the 174
177. 426 U.S. 373, 390 (1976).
178. Daniel Twetten, Public Law 280 and the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act: Could Two
Wrongs Ever Be Made into a Right?, 90 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1317, 1325 n.56
(2000).
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 1327.
183. Id.
184. Robert B. Edgerton, Menominee Termination: Observations on the End of a Tribe,
21 HUM. ORG. 10, 10 (1962).
185. Id. at 11.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.
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council members, but a referendum was not created to allow the
approximately 3000 enrolled members to provide input into arguably one of
the Tribe’s most important decisions in modern history. 189
Although the Menominee politicians were proud of the passage of the
Menominee Termination Act in the immediate aftermath of termination,
tribal members soon realized that the Act carried with it devastating and
lasting results.190 Tribal members feared losing land to new taxes. 191 Tribal
members met in opposition to termination, vocalizing their confusion over
what termination entailed. 192 The Menominee economy faced crisis. 193
Before termination, the Menominee Tribe maintained economic subsistence
because tribal enterprises were exempt from state regulations and were not
subject to external taxation. 194 Termination meant that businesses had to
expend money to meet state standards. 195 The previous tax exemptions led
companies to adopt a business model based on employment maximization,
not profits.196 Individual Menominees became subject to state taxation and
this reduction in their income threatened subsistence. 197
Readily apparent was the depletion of the Tribe’s cash reserve. 198 Before
the passage of the Menominee Termination Act, the government held
$10,437,000 in trust for the Tribe.199 Expenditures such as pre-termination
studies and improvements to facilities to meet state licensing requirements
cost the Tribe $12,265,424 by 1960.200 Just four years later, the Tribe’s
account contained only $300,000.201 The depleting account meant that
interest payments decreased and the termination of federal programs led to
the Tribe having to pay to provide services to tribal members.202 Without

189.
190.
191.
192.
193.

Id.
Id. at 14.
Id.
Id.
Stephen J. Herzberg, The Menominee Indians: Termination to Restoration, 6 AM.
INDIAN L. REV. 143, 171 (1978).
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 172.
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the interest payments, the Tribe had to rely on the “struggling tribal
enterprises.”203
The well-being of tribal members declined as services could no longer be
provided.204 The Tribe had maintained a hospital, but it was forced to
close. 205 Federal funding was no longer available after termination and the
medical facilities had to comply with state regulations. 206 After spending
$300,000 attempting to get the facilities in compliance, the system was
abandoned. 207 Menominees who did not qualify for welfare or have
insurance through employment were deprived of healthcare due to the
expense of private doctors.208 Those who did have insurance were faced
with difficulties reaching care as many tribal members did not have
transportation.209 Fears of discrimination and Western medicine devoid of
tribal practice meant that many Menominees did not seek treatment. 210
When the hospital closed, more than healthcare was sacrificed. 211 The
facility had functioned as a social hub where friends conversed and the
homeless sought shelter.212
The Menominees numbered amongst the few in America who lived
without electricity or water and the previously lucrative tribal mill did not
provide assistance. Before termination, tribal members had access to free
electricity and water.213 The Menominee Tribe had actually been selected
by the federal government for termination because of its relative wealth in
comparison to other tribes.214 After termination, the tribal power plants
were forced to shut down due to licensing requirements.215 Inspection of the
mill before termination revealed that it contained 132 state code
violations.216 After expending $100,000 to get the plant into compliance,
203. Id.
204. Nancy Oestreich Lurie, Menominee Termination: From Reservation to Colony, 31
HUM. ORG. 257, 261 (1972).
205. Id.
206. Herzberg, supra note 193, at 172.
207. Id. at 172-73.
208. Id. at 173-74.
209. Id. at 174.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 175.
214. Christine K. Lemley & John H. Teller, Reports from the Field, “Eneq's Ke:s Kake:ketikuaq Omae:qnomene:wak” (“The Menominee Have Spoken”): Mentorship and
Collaboration in an Indigenous Community, 53 J. AM. INDIAN EDUC. no. 1, 2014, at 42, 46.
215. Herzberg, supra note 193, at 175.
216. Id. at 176.
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the Tribe encountered management and personnel difficulties. 217 BIA
employees formerly directing the mill had to be replaced by private
managers who were unfamiliar with smaller tribal businesses. 218
Attempts by the managers to adopt Western models for larger businesses
on the reservation failed. 219 For example, the replacement of tribal trucks
with larger commercial models led to expansion of tribal roads.220 Despite
this undertaking, the trucks were still unable to be used as they sank into the
reservation roads.221 The work environment shifted as cost-limiting
practices were employed, focusing the business not on employment but
rather on profit.222 These measures were unable to turn the mill into a
highly profitable business. 223 The mill began to lay off workers, leading to a
difficult search for jobs in surrounding areas.224
Land ownership drastically shifted as termination forced the Tribe to
implement individual ownership. The Menominee had long regarded
communal ownership of the land as tying the people to their culture and
tradition. 225 Although the termination act did not address the topic of land
ownership, the tribal government could not resist parceling and selling the
land.226 The land and tribal assets were placed under the authority of
Menominee Enterprises, Inc.227 The board of directors decided to use the
land for housing and have it appraised and offered to be sold to its current
occupants.228 Many of the occupants could not afford to buy the land they
lived on.229 The land was offered at fair market value, but the aesthetics of
the land increased its value.230 Land was sold to pay taxes, and where taxes
were not paid, Menominee families were forced to relinquish ownership. 231
Menominee people left traditional lands to seek employment in the city. 232
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 176-77.
Id. at 177.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 179.
Id. at 182.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 183.
Id.
Lurie, supra note 204, at 261.
Id.
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This action did not always bring prosperity but rather provided merely a
switch from rural to urban poverty. 233
Additional sales of tribal land to outsiders further eroded the tribal land
base. After other efforts had proven unsuccessful, the Tribe entered an
agreement to sell land. 234 There is some doubt the stockholders understood
the economic development plan they were voting on would result in the sale
of additional tribal lands to non-members.235 A developer was hired who
created an artificial lake and sold 2600 building sites. 236 The plan took land
out of tribal use and required the Tribe to provide additional services, which
had to be paid for by the land sales.237 Though the agreement with the
developer was terminated, the land loss is still felt. 238
Broader consequences of termination affect the identity of tribal
members to this day. Termination aimed at assimilation, and in this pursuit,
the Menominee lost elements of culture and connection as a people. 239 As
the state was enabled to exercise greater power, the Menominee people
were denied the level of self-determination the trusteeship of the BIA
provided for them. 240 Menominee children born after June 17, 1954, cannot
be recognized as tribal citizens.241 A community once tied together by the
land began to fracture as people left the reservation in pursuit of work. 242
The freedom promised by the termination act actually made the Menominee
“the wards of many masters.”243
5. Application to Trump Administration Policies and Goals
The current climate in the United States is an echo of post-World War II
attitudes that guided termination policies. President Trump appears to be
concerned with citizens perceiving disparate treatment based on race. 244
Although Indian status is not a racial classification but rather a political
one, it may be perceived by the general public as a racial category. 245 The
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.

Id.
Herzberg, supra note 193, at 183.
Id. at 183-84.
Id. at 184.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 185.
Lurie, supra note 204, at 261.
Herzberg, supra note 193, at 185.
Id.
Id.
Perez, supra note 18.
Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 553-54 (1974).
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Trump administration has indicated several ways that federally recognized
Indians are treated differently than non-member Americans. First, tribes
have less access to their land and energy resources because of complex
bureaucratic protections.246 Second, President Trump has voiced concern
that Native Americans receive benefits that other minorities do not receive,
including access to federal programs. 247 However, although cohesion and
equality are valid goals, pursuing them in Indian Country is a complex
process due to the federal-tribal relationship that has not existed with other
minority groups.
While reducing federal oversight of tribal actions is a stated goal of the
Trump administration, 248 the Termination Era warns that drastic actions will
have lasting impacts. HCR 108 ushered in the Termination Era and
promoted the idea that tribal members should be treated in the same way as
other American citizens.249 The goal of integrating tribes into mainstream
society in effect destroyed tribal sovereignty that existed for thousands of
years. Termination acts passed in pursuit of the policy led to the sale of the
tribal land base, as well as to many tribal members leaving traditional
lands.250 Without a land base, the tribes did not have an area to assert
jurisdiction. Although the termination acts did not explicitly eliminate
inherent tribal sovereignty, after termination, tribes did not continue to
assert this power.251 Because the tribal-federal relationship was eliminated,
lands held by tribes and the incomes of tribal members previously gained
on the reservation became subject to state and federal taxes.252 Additionally,
businesses were under the regulatory authority of the state. 253 This meant
that tribes had to expend a great amount of money on taxes from which they
had previously been shielded. More money was spent on bringing
businesses up to state codes.254 These same effects may be seen today if
tribal lands are sufficiently deregulated. Lands may be removed from the
tribal land base and no longer subject to tribal jurisdiction. Tribal members

246. Trump Remarks at Energy Roundtable, supra note 3, at 1.
247. Statement by President Donald J. Trump on Signing H.R. 244 into Law, WHITE
HOUSE (May 5, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/statement-presi
dent-donald-j-trump-signing-h-r-244-law/.
248. Trump Remarks at Energy Roundtable, supra note 3, at 1.
249. Wilkinson & Biggs, supra note 115, at 149.
250. Herzberg, supra note 193, at 183.
251. Wilkinson & Biggs, supra note 115, at 154.
252. Walch, supra note 108, at 1189.
253. Herzberg, supra note 193, at 171.
254. Id.
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and businesses could be under the domain of state government and may be
subject to state taxes.
Trump’s policy of reducing regulatory hurdles in the development of
tribal land may make access to resources easier, but it is essential that states
do not take the role the federal government previously asserted. When
federal power is limited in Indian Country, state authority could likely be
found permissible. PL 280 enabled states to take over criminal jurisdiction
and civil adjudicatory jurisdiction from the federal government. 255 Not only
did this lead to the heavy utilization of state courts to adjudicate claims the
tribes would traditionally resolve in culturally appropriate manners, but it
also led to a gap in enforcement.256 When the federal government pulls out
of programs, funding may go with it. This means that tribes may no longer
have the resources to provide services or enforce regulations. States may
gain jurisdiction, but the states are then tasked with allocating additional
funds to ensure enforcement. This process does not always occur.
While tribal self-determination is an admirable goal, it is one that needs
to be undergone in a gradual manner. As evidenced by the Termination Era,
the removal of federal programs and oversight can yield breakdowns in
Indian Country. Tribes are more likely to be located in remote places,
making access to services beyond the reservation costly or impractical once
federal support is removed. 257 Additionally, tribal budgets take into account
federal funding. Tribes need time to find funds to replace federal support.
Therefore, the oversight processes that Trump’s administration seeks to
curtail need to be evaluated to determine if they need to be replaced by
tribal regulations or processes. These processes must be implemented
without a lapse period in which lands are leased or alienated without tribal
approval informed by the impact of the transaction.
Enabling approval of leases and other land transactions without large
bureaucratic hurdles may promote tribal energy resource development, but
it may threaten the continued recognition of tribal sovereignty. As lands are
alienated, it is more likely that courts will assume tribes no longer have
jurisdiction over the lands. Erosion of the tribal land base would threaten
the continuance of the tribe, perhaps without the approval of tribal
governments and a majority of tribal members. Although this would not be
termination in name, it could evolve into de facto termination. Sale of lands
or leasing of lands that were previously utilized as family residences may
255. Jimenez & Song, supra note 140, at 1657-65.
256. Twetten, supra note 178, at 1325.
257. Herzberg, supra note 193, at 174.
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yield in the movement of tribal members off the reservation. This would
allow for more energy development of the land, but it could yield a loss of
cohesion amongst tribal members that threatens the endurance of tribal
constituencies. Tribal members who move off the reservation will be
subject to state and federal taxes. In order to meet the requirements of
monetary obligations off the reservation, members may be forced to
abandon elements of culture in order to secure profitable jobs.
A further complicating factor is that with reduced federal oversight of
tribal lands, the utilization of tribal resources may be up to tribal
governments who are not always representative of member interests at
large. After tribes were encouraged to create governments under the IRA,
some tribes have been governed by systems that are incompatible with
tribal beliefs and values. 258 Federal oversight has delayed development of
tribal resources, but it has also served as additional protection of tribal
members from tribal government action that is against the best interest of its
members. The elimination of this barrier could put members at the will of
governments that are not representative of tribal culture or desires.
Therefore, reformation of tribal governments and regulations is important
before removal of existing regulations.
In any discussion of tribal development, it is important to remember that
the type of development tribes wish to undergo does not always mirror the
type of development occurring in the United States at large. Despite the
belief that energy development on tribal lands may be in the best interest of
the country, the needs of individual tribes must be considered. It is easy to
assume that tribes want to develop and turn resources into profit, but that is
not necessarily the case. Even if that is the case, tribes may be interested in
different development than what the current administration believes is the
best plan of action. In the pursuit of self-determination and the observation
of inherent tribal sovereignty, it is important to include tribes in the
decision-making process and to allow tribes to pursue their own courses of
development if regulations and restraints are removed.
B. Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA)
1. Background and Goals
Occupying a remote part of the country, which became sparsely
populated by Westerners only later in American history, the treatment of
Alaskan Natives vastly differed from that of tribes in the lower forty-eight.
258. Robert L. Bee, Structure, Ideology, and Tribal Governments, 58 HUM. ORG. 285,
286 (1999).
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When the United States entered into a Treaty of Cession with Russia in
1867, it was announced that the indigenous people living there would be
“subject to such laws and regulations as the United States may, from time to
time, adopt in regard to aboriginal tribes of that country.”259 The Alaskan
Statehood Act of 1958 indicated that land and property of Indians, Eskimos,
and Aleuts was to be held in trust by the United States until further
congressional action dictated otherwise.260 The Statehood Act granted
Alaska the ability to select 102.5 million acres from public lands. 261
However, as the state began to select lands, Native villages objected to
certain land claims, and the Secretary of the Interior halted patenting until
the claims could be settled. 262 The discovery of oil in Alaska prompted the
resolution of land claims so that development of resources could proceed. 263
The land claims were extinguished through the passage in 1971 of the
Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA). 264 While Native Alaskans
initially supported ANCSA because they believed the Act would recognize
their land holdings and enable them to maintain their traditional ways of
life, viewpoints have since evolved. 265
2. Statutory Framework
Beyond freeing up land for oil development, ANCSA has been claimed
to have the goal of supporting economic and political independence of
tribes.266 Overall, the Act initially provided for the granting of title to forty
million acres of land, the provision of $962.5 million to various Native
groups, and the creation of twelve regional Native corporations and 220
village corporations to manage benefits awarded by the federal

259. Treaty Concerning the Cession of the Russian Possessions in North America by His
Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias to the United States of America, Russ.-U.S., art. 3,
Mar. 30, 1867, 15 Stat. 539.
260. Pub. L. No. 85–508, § 4, 72 Stat. 339, 339.
261. Id. § 6(b), 72 Stat. at 340.
262. COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 4.07(3)(b)(i), at 329 (Nell Jessup
Newton et al. eds., 2012).
263. Id.
264. Pub. L. No. 92-203, 85 Stat. 688 (1971); see Martha Hirschfield, Note, The Alaska
Native Claims Settlement Act: Tribal Sovereignty and the Corporate Form, 101 YALE L.J.
1331, 1331 (1992).
265. Hirschfield, supra note 264, at 1331.
266. Gordon Scott Harrison, The Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, 1971, 25 ARCTIC
232, 232 (1972).
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government.267 In return for these benefits, Alaska was divided into twelve
regions that were purportedly based on commonalities in culture amongst
Alaskan Native groups.268 The regions incorporated as businesses for profit
under state laws. 269 One hundred shares of stock in the corporation were
given to enrolled members of that region. 270 The village divisions were also
meant to incorporate. 271 Stocks were made inalienable for twenty years to
provide tribes with time to acclimate to the new organization.272 Both levels
of corporations were empowered to hold land, but the title varied based on
the level of the corporation holding the land. 273
The regional and village corporations hold different roles in disbursing
and managing the settlement. The village corporations were tasked with
selecting twenty-two million acres of land, with each village receiving land
proportionately according to the Native population it entailed. 274 These
holdings only included the surface estate. 275 Regional corporations selected
a total of sixteen million acres of land. 276 The Secretary of the Interior could
convey two million additional acres so that the corporations could manage
significant sites such as cemeteries or historical markers. 277 These
landholdings comprise a total of forty million acres of land. 278 Regional
corporations hold the subsurface estates of these allocated lands. 279 An
elaborate scheme dictates how each region is to distribute a portion of its
profits to the other regions. 280 The region is responsible for the monetary
settlement held in the Alaska Native Fund. 281 This fund’s contents
comprised general appropriations in the amount of $462.5 million. 282 An
amount of $500 million in mineral revenues is also under regional
267. 43 U.S.C. § 1613 (2012); id. § 1605(a); id. § 1606(a); id. § 1607; Harrison, supra
note 266, at 232.
268. 43 U.S.C. § 1606(a).
269. Id. § 1606(d).
270. Id. § 1606(g)(1)(A).
271. Id. § 1607(a).
272. Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, Pub. L. No. 92-203, § 7(h)(1), 85 Stat. 688,
692 (1971).
273. 43 U.S.C. § 1613(f).
274. Hirschfield, supra note 264, at 1336; 43 U.S.C. § 1613(a).
275. 43 U.S.C. § 1613(f).
276. Hirschfield, supra note 264, at 1336.
277. 43 U.S.C. § 1613(h).
278. Hirschfield, supra note 264, at 1336.
279. 43 U.S.C. § 1613(f).
280. Hirschfield, supra note 264, at 1336.
281. Id.
282. Id.
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domain. 283 Regions receive payment from this fund based on the number of
shareholders.284
ANCSA’s framework requires the village and regional corporations to
work together in various ways despite the village corporations not being a
stockholder or subsidiary of the regional corporations to which they
report.285 During the first five years after the passage of ANCSA, the
regional corporations oversaw payments from the Alaska Native Fund and
natural resource revenue to the villages. 286 The regional corporations had
the ability to deny funds until village usage plans were approved and had
the authority to approve the villages’ budgets and articles of
incorporation.287 Regions could compel joint ventures amongst the villages
to best support the region as a whole. 288 Even though villages were afforded
the decision of when subsurface development would occur within their
domain, accountability became an issue as the surface and subsurface rights
to a piece of land could be held by different corporations.289
Although the Act purported to address the real and pressing needs of
Natives in Alaska, it failed to fully address them. Commentators are split
amongst whether ANCSA posed de facto termination or whether tribes
were simply transformed into corporations. 290 Those who argue
transformation recognize it came with diminished self-determination. 291
Native corporations had to make initial expenditures of the settlement funds
to address essential needs such as housing and drinking water.292 Education
and training were seen as pressing needs as well. 293 While the resources
provided by the Act were meant to improve the well-being of villages, the
corporate model became a hindrance.294 Studies conducted after the
implementation of the Act found that the corporations garnered limited
283. Id.
284. Arthur Lazarus, Jr. & W. Richard West, Jr., The Alaska Native Claims Settlement
Act: A Flawed Victory, 40 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 132, 136 (1976).
285. Hirschfield, supra note 264, at 1337.
286. Id.
287. Lazarus & West, supra note 284, at 135.
288. Hirschfield, supra note 264, at 1337.
289. Id.
290. Natalie Landreth & Erin Dougherty, The Use of the Alaskan Native Claims
Settlement Act to Justify Disparate Treatment of Alaska’s Tribes, 36 AM. INDIAN L. REV.
321, 326 (2012).
291. Id.
292. Hirschfield, supra note 264, at 1338.
293. Id.
294. Id.
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success in promoting the economic well-being of villages. 295 The corporate
structure’s success was limited to the small number of jobs the entities
created. 296
The corporations had the goals of not only succeeding financially but
also providing great changes in the lives of Native Alaskans. 297
Unfortunately, both goals were initially undermined by a variety of factors
that limited the independence of the corporations. 298 The corporations
suffered from inexperience and lack of education regarding business. 299 In
the twenty years following the enactment of ANCSA, Native corporations
had differing levels of economic success. 300 One faced bankruptcy in 1988,
while another was making more money than the combined income of the
other Native corporations. 301 The Act required corporate compliance, which
funneled out money from company profitability and individual payouts. 302
Resources were limited based on inflation in the 1970s, as well as litigation
over the meaning of ambiguous provisions of ANCSA. 303 Delays were
experienced in receiving title to the land. 304 To counteract these influences,
some corporations chose to merge. 305 Others contemplated selling land.306
In 1988, before the twenty-year implementation period was set to expire,
the ANCSA amendments became law.307 Native groups wanted to ensure
that once the implementation period ended, Natives would retain control
over corporate membership and the assets of the corporations would be
protected. 308 The restraint on alienability of stock in the corporations for the
twenty-year period had insulated the corporations from external
pressures.309 Were the restraint to be removed, it was feared that outsiders
could threaten tribal ownership.310 The amendments allow the corporations
295. Id.
296. Id.
297. Id.
298. Catherine Lynn Allison, Note, Alaska Native Corporations: Reclaiming the
Namesake; Effectuating the Purpose, 42 PUB. CONT. L.J. 869, 874 (2013).
299. Id.
300. Id. at 875.
301. Id. at 875.
302. Hirschfield, supra note 264, at 1339.
303. Id.
304. Id.
305. Id.
306. Id.
307. Id. at 1340.
308. Id.
309. Id.
310. Id.
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to decide if they would like to extend the restraints on alienability and also
allow corporations to create different kinds of stock with different voting
rights.311
Even in areas where the village and the region retain Native ownership,
conflicts between the two could mean that villages are forced to undergo
development they do not wish to occur.312 The amendments do allow for
Native Alaskans born after the cutoff date to become stockholders but at the
discretion of the existing stockholders. 313 There is a different interest in
stockholding than that in business at large. 314 Traditionally, a stockholder
buys stock with the understanding that it will be alienable. 315 However,
stockholding in these corporations depends on Native status and thus serves
as a symbol of Native cooperation and cultural recognition. 316 Congress has
granted quasi-tribal status to these corporations. 317 Treating them as
traditional business or private entities is at odds with notions of selfgovernance and sovereignty involved in federal Indian law. 318
Fearing the development of Indian Country in Alaska, legislators
involved in the amendments created a settlement trust option that would
allow for a certain level of protection for some corporate property. 319 Trusts
chartered under state law may hold and manage corporate land to promote
various interests of the tribe. 320 The trust cannot hold any subsurface
estates, and regional corporations can prevent villages from placing land in
trust.321 The trust is not allowed to convey land it holds to Natives without
ANCSA stock.322
3. Impacts
Although the amendments do allow for the continuation of restraints on
alienation, these protections can be eliminated by a majority vote. 323 The
311. Id. at 1341.
312. Id.
313. Id.
314. Id. at 1341.
315. Id. at 1341-42.
316. Id. at 1342.
317. Id. at 1342-43.
318. Id.
319. Id. at 1343.
320. Id. at 1344.
321. Id.
322. Id.
323. Julia A. Bowen, Note, The Option of Preserving a Heritage: The 1987 Amendments
to the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, 15 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 391, 405-06 (1991).
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protections of ANCSA provide that the stock is to remain in Native hands
until the twenty-year period expires. 324 That meant that after December 18,
1991, stock would become freely alienable. 325 The amendments allow a
corporation to continue restraints on alienability or to discontinue it. 326 The
fate of corporate stock may be at the whim of a majority vote. 327
Recapitalization of stock is enabled through the amendments in which a
corporation could create different levels of stock corresponding to different
rights.328 If this were to occur, stock held by Native Alaskans could be
reduced in power such that voting could be skewed in the direction of nonIndian stockholders.329 The requirements surrounding the trust are
problematic because subsurface rights cannot be placed in trust.330 To get
benefits from them, the corporation must continue to exist. 331 If the profits
dwindle, Native people may have to end the corporation and lose the
subsurface rights.332
Although corporations have potential to become highly profitable and to
encourage self-determination, placing intricate business decisions in the
hands of people without experience or training in the area places them at a
strong disadvantage. 333 Many of the Native shareholders are not familiar
with business.334 The economic struggles of the corporations often put the
stockholders in a position where they must sell or lose land rights in order
to avoid debt.335 Natives are forced to make decisions not according to
independent action, but according to survival. 336
While ANCSA has increased Native visibility in Alaskan politics, it has
not been as successful at increasing the general welfare of Alaskan
Natives.337 Natives still rely greatly on welfare. Even with welfare benefits
figured in, an estimated twenty-five percent of Native Alaskans lived below
324. Id.
325. Id. at 406.
326. Id. at 405-06.
327. Id. at 406.
328. Id.
329. Id.
330. Id. at 406-07.
331. Id. at 407.
332. Id.
333. Id.
334. Id.
335. Id. at 407-08.
336. Id. at 408.
337. Gary C. Anders, Social and Economic Consequences of Federal Indian Policy: A
Case Study of the Alaska Natives, 37 ECON. DEV. & CULTURAL CHANGE 285, 294 (1989).
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the poverty level in 1989.338 Over half of Native Alaskans over sixteenyears-old were unemployed in 1985.339 There is a disparity of outcomes
between rural and urban Alaskan Natives. 340 In rural areas, some culture
and language are preserved, but assistance is needed to provide tools with
which to carry out traditional practices. 341 These rural communities require
financial aid to afford hunting tools and utilities, as well as service
support.342 In villages not engaged in commercial fishing, around eighty
percent of jobs resulted from state expenditures in 1989.343
Having endured assimilative and other destructive pressures before the
passage of ANCSA, the failures of the Act to provide needed benefits has
led to a variety of social problems. 344 For example, mental illness and
suicide especially impact young adult males. 345
ANCSA attacks tribal sovereignty traditionally afforded to tribes because
sovereignty that is typically viewed as inherent within the tribe is partially
granted to Alaskan Natives based on land grants to private entities that
allow for limited tribal autonomy. ANCSA reduces recognized tribal
sovereignty because it recognizes land holdings as grants from the federal
government.346 While a tribe may be able to retain sovereignty without
landholdings, a separation of land and governance weakens a tribe’s
autonomy. 347 Market influences can dictate how corporations are managed
apart from tribal wishes.348 When Natives are limited to operating within
the constraints of a corporation, it becomes difficult to provide for
communities.349 Corporations do not have the full functionality of a
government.350 Their sovereign action is limited. 351

338.
339.
340.
341.
342.
343.
344.
345.
346.
347.
348.
349.
350.
351.

Id.
Id. at 294-95.
Id.
Id. at 294-96.
Id. at 295-96.
Id. at 296.
Id. at 296-97.
Id.
Hirschfield, supra note 264, at 1347.
Id. at 1348.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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4. Application to Trump Administration Policies and Goals
ANCSA provides a warning for downplaying Indian interests in pursuit
of energy development. ANCSA was a result of a similar climate of
American energy dominance. 352 The Trump administration has not made
direct statements indicating a desire to privatize Indian land or transform
tribal holdings into corporate holdings, but the aftermath of ANCSA
provides key takeaways to remember when addressing tribal energy
development and harmonizing this with American energy interests.
While utilizing previously dormant lands may yield initial profits,
forcing development on tribes erodes tribal sovereignty, even when tribes
have a role in subsequent development. Under ANCSA, tribal governments
were transformed into corporations. 353 While these corporations have
control in business decisions, the tribes were denied the large decision
regarding transformation into a corporate entity under state law. Tribes are
no longer able to assert full sovereignty because businesses do not perform
all of the same functions as a government. Additionally, tribes are required
to adhere to state corporate laws. 354 This means that tribal sovereigns have
to yield to the power of the state. Market pressures can turn choices into
forced action in order to preserve some tribal power. If corporations go
bankrupt, tribes lose access to subsurface resources. 355 The framework of
the corporate structure means that not only the state has power over a
tribe’s actions but so do other tribes.356 Regional corporations can dictate
some actions of the village corporations. 357 These regional corporations are
made up of several Native groups that may have divergent goals and
cultural considerations. 358
Decisions made by the Trump administration could potentially erode
tribal sovereignty in a similar way that ANCSA has, by forcing tribes to
adhere to new regulations. While tribes have been subject to federal
oversight as part of the federal-tribal trust relationship for many years,
removing long-standing limitations on Indian actions with regards to land
could erode the tribal land base without the tribe’s consent. This is why it is
essential that tribes have their own regulations and processes in place in
anticipation of changes in federal oversight. Without tribal processes, tribes
352.
353.
354.
355.
356.
357.
358.

Harrison, supra note 266, at 232.
Hirschfield, supra note 264, at 1331-32.
Id. at 1332.
Bowen, supra note 323, at 407.
Hirschfield, supra note 264, at 1337.
Id.
Id. at 1335.
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may lose land holdings and therefore power. Additionally, while the Trump
administration is wise in including tribal leaders and states in discussions
on regulatory reform, it is important to learn from ANCSA that allowing
other tribes and states to assert authority over a particular tribe’s
landholdings further erodes sovereignty and undermines tribal interests. 359
Discussions amongst diverse groups may provide insights into reforms, but
if success is to occur, it is important that individual tribes have authority
over the development of their own land. This ensures that tribes have the
fullest sovereign authority possible to cater development to local needs and
beliefs.
ANCSA made lands inalienable for a portion of years, which may pose a
possible option for tribal development if many restraints on alienation are
removed. 360 If the Trump administration does push for privatization of lands
or the removal of restraints on land, it may be in tribes’ best interest to keep
lands unalienable for a period to ensure that tribal mechanisms are in place
to retain tribal land holdings. In the first years after the enactment of
ANCSA, tribes allocated money to the most pressing issues, including
healthcare and schooling. 361 If restraints on alienation had not been put in
place, tribal members could have sought immediate money to address these
needs by selling shares, meaning that holdings could have quickly fallen out
of tribal control. A similar process could take place if restraints on
alienation were removed under the Trump administration. In tribal areas
where necessities are not met, tribal members may be encouraged to
address immediate concerns despite these actions risking the continuance of
tribal authority.
When individuals make decisions that will personally impact them,
responsible regulations and policies are more likely to be created. Under the
ANCSA framework, regional corporations could make decisions without
the approval of village corporations. 362 This framework meant that the
regional corporation could pursue its overall best interest without regard to
individual village welfare. In order to maintain the corporation, profit may
be prioritized over the welfare of Native Alaskans. Therefore,
individualized plans of action with regard to energy development on tribal
lands should be created at the tribal level and should be undertaken by
traditional governments rather than tribal corporations. Not only would this
enable tribes to consider their individual needs, it would also mean that
359.
360.
361.
362.

Trump Remarks at Energy Roundtable, supra note 3, at 1.
Hirschfield, supra note 264, at 1332.
Id. at 1338.
Id. at 1337.
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more thought could be given to tribal endurance and environmental
sustainability.
The status of Native Alaskans after ANCSA creates confusion that
inhibits tribal action. Native Alaskan villages are considered quasi-tribal. 363
They do not have the same rights and recognition as tribes in the lower
forty-eight states, but they retain a level of federal recognition. 364 The
removal of restraints on Indian lands in the continental United States,
accompanied by reductions in regulations, could yield discussions relating
to the extent of the tribal-federal relationship. It is important that these
questions are resolved with tribal input and made sufficiently clear so that
tribes can pursue development without needing to litigate questions of
authority. Leaving unanswered questions regarding federal authority in
tribal development would mean expensive litigation or stalls in tribal plans.
IV. Conclusion
Both the Termination Era and ANCSA warn against changes in federal
Indian policy without consultation with tribal governments and deep
conversations into the possible impacts of policy. While reductions in
federal oversight may be vital steps in allowing for the development of
tribal resources, the federal government must recognize the importance of
preserving tribal sovereignty. Tribes must be given time and authority to
implement individualized regulations that come into effect before federal
protections are removed. Without the allowance of sufficient time to
implement protective measures, tribes are at risk of de facto termination.
However, if the federal government works closely with tribal governments,
removal of federal oversight could enhance a tribe’s ability to utilize fuller
sovereignty.
The Termination Era warns that policy must be informed by the
understanding that Indian status is a political, and not a racial,
classification. Although racial equality is an important goal, inequalities in
the treatment of tribes raise different questions than disparate treatment
amongst people of different races. Federally recognized tribes have a
special relationship with the federal government. This relationship comes
with responsibilities that are not necessarily owed to other groups. Tribes as
sovereigns have different interests than other minority groups.
In order to maintain their rights as sovereigns, tribes usually need access
to land, a body of constituents, and resources. Deregulation of the
363. Id. at 1342.
364. Id. at 1343.
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bureaucracy created to oversee tribal actions may have a great impact on
tribes’ access to these essential elements. When restraints on alienation of
lands are removed without tribal regulations or laws on the disposition of
land, individual members may decide single-handedly to decrease the
tribe’s landholdings. This would be similar to a United States citizen selling
his land to another nation, removing the land from the United States’
control. Such actions could greatly undermine the functioning of a
government that needs land to assert jurisdiction. If the tribal-federal
relationship were sufficiently transformed so that greater state control was
present in Indian Country, Indians and their land could be subject to state
taxes. These taxes would not only limit the amount of income individual
Indians receive, regardless of where the income came from, but would also
decrease the amount of money tribes held. Reduction in land and income
limits sovereignty in that tribes have more limited courses of action.
When PL 280 was passed, federal authority was replaced with state
authority, and federal funding was removed. This same process could
happen if the federal government were to remove oversight of tribal land
holdings and allow for greater state participation. If tribes do not have
sufficient revenue apart from federal aid, even if tribal regulations are
passed, there may be insufficient funds to carry them out. States could
attempt to assert their own regulations, which could yield confusion over
sovereign authority. Confusion may inhibit tribal action and energy
development. The best course of action if the federal government wished to
reduce federal oversight would be to give tribes support and time to
implement their own regulations to take the place of similar federal rules.
Any intrusion of tribal authority by state authority needs to be fully
discussed with the potentially impacted tribes. Robust conversations
between tribes and the federal government would include the structure of
the tribal government and its ability to carry out the functions the federal
government has previously provided. Reducing federal oversight
diminishes federal protection of tribal members from unwise decisions of
the tribal government. This reality further indicates the importance of tribal
regulations to replace this function, as well as a capable government to
implement the regulations.
Although it is time-consuming, the most effective manner to alter federal
control over land in Indian Country is to address each tribe individually.
Some tribes will have larger governments that are capable of enforcing their
own regulations and adjudicating disputes. Other tribes may lack judicial
systems or well-staffed governments and require more time to develop
these. ANCSA indicates that one possible way to allow for a transition of
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power is to place a terminable restraint on the alienation of lands. Once
tribes are satisfied with their abilities to direct land sales themselves, they
may remove federal restrictions. Tribes will likely have different opinions
on energy development and the relationship they wish to have with the
federal government. Respecting tribal sovereignty should entail respecting a
tribe’s individual plans for energy development.
ANCSA warns against unilateral choices by the federal government in
Indian Country. While freeing lands for energy development may allow for
lucrative resource extraction, it leaves a lasting mark on those whose voices
were silenced in the process. This is not to say that resource development
should not take place but rather that it should be the result of collaborations
between all parties involved. The structure of ANCSA enabled different
Native groups to control the actions of others. This inhibits Native Alaskan
groups from practicing self-determination. In the lower forty-eight states, it
is important that individual tribes control actions regarding lands under
their domain. It should be remembered that tribes are individual sovereigns
and not a collective whole. Additionally, local action at the tribal level is
more likely to take into account the impacts development will have on
individual tribal members and the environment. When groups who will face
the consequences of the action make the decision to take the action, more
thought will hopefully be given to environmental sustainability and human
welfare.
While it may appear that the federal government can consider Indian
interests adequately without always receiving tribal input, a recent action of
the executive branch warns against hasty action without local cooperation
and insight. The Trump administration recently vocalized that it will “cease
all implementation” of the Paris Climate Accord. 365 The National Congress
of American Indians reports that climate change has a disproportionate
impact on tribes, and therefore, President Trump’s intent to withdraw from
the Paris Climate Accord may have larger impacts on tribal development
than elsewhere in the country. 366 The locale of reservations and the
continuance of subsistence practices by some tribes mean that impacts on
climate can affect health, food supply, and culture. 367 These are realities that
may not enter the discussion at the federal level but nonetheless are vital
considerations for well-rounded decision-making.
365. Remarks Announcing United States Withdrawal from the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change Paris Agreement, 2017 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC.
1 (Jun. 1, 2017).
366. NAT’L CONG. OF AM. INDIANS, supra note 68, at 9.
367. Id.
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